MTN Nigeria has roughly 90 million subscribers. Its MTN fintech arm ended 2025 with 3.7 million active wallets. That number is not a gap. It is a question. How does a company with 90 million people already paying it every month end up with less than 5% of them using its financial product?
In August 2026, MTN Group CEO Ralph Mupita told TechCabal the company wants that 3.7 million to become 30 million. New technology is coming from Alibaba, Alipay, and Ant International. MTN is preparing to lend directly from its own balance sheet. The ambition is real. So is the gap.
But before you file this as just another corporate comeback story, read what the MTN CEO said about how they got here. He was unusually honest about it. And that honesty is where the lesson lives.
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The numbers MTN’s own filings put on the table
MTN Nigeria published 2025 financial statements showing the company wrote down the value of its fintech investments by roughly 62.5 billion naira. An independent valuation placed those two fintech units, MoMo PSB and Yello Digital, at less than half of what MTN had listed them at on its own books. Active wallets had fallen as low as 2.1 million at one point in 2025 before recovering to 3.7 million by year end. MTN described these units as loss-making.
Then it gets more specific. In April 2026, MTN Nigeria agreed to sell a 60% stake in both units to its own parent company, MTN Group, while retaining 40%. MTN Group also injected an extra 5 billion naira into MoMo PSB in the fourth quarter of 2025 alone, according to Nairametrics. This is not a company casually mentioning a growth target. This is real capital moving between real entities to keep a struggling business alive long enough to turn it around.
The admission almost nobody is quoting in full
Karl Toriola, MTN Nigeria CEO, said something to BusinessDay South Africa in June 2026 that deserved far more attention than it got. He described the 2019 entry into Nigerian fintech as arriving with “three different weights tied to our legs.” The first weight: the platform “was not fit for purpose for that kind of market.” He also named licensing constraints that slowed things down before they could build real momentum.
Toriola then explained what winning had looked like in a different market. Ghana, 2009. MTN entered early, before any digital financial infrastructure existed, before even basic mobile codes for money transfers were in place. In his words: “We captured all of the opportunity, growing gradually over time.” His meaning was plain: in Ghana, they showed up first. In Nigeria, they showed up in 2019, after OPay, after millions of Nigerians had already made their first choice about which fintech to trust.
That is the whole explanation, delivered by the person running the business, in language specific enough to actually mean something. Nigerian corporate leaders rarely talk about their own failures this directly. The instinct in this market is silence, or spin, or something vague about macroeconomic conditions. Toriola named the platform gap and the timing problem on the record, before announcing the fix. That candor is worth noticing on its own terms, separate from whether the turnaround works.
The fix, and who’s now running it
MTN Nigeria has appointed Bode Abifarin as CEO of MoMo PSB, effective September 1, 2026. She spent 15 years at KPMG advising financial institutions across Africa, then moved to Flutterwave as chief operating officer, helping scale operations across multiple markets and building the regulatory relationships needed to operate in each one. She was handed a business that the people who appointed her openly described as being in distress.
Worth noting: this is not only a Nigerian problem. In South Africa, only 2 million of the 40 million MTN subscribers there use its mobile money platform. The same conversion gap, in a different market. MTN attributes that to high existing banking penetration in South Africa rather than a product failure. But the pattern is consistent. In the markets where MTN entered before the habits were formed, the numbers are strong. In the markets where it arrived after, they are not.
What this means if you’re not MTN
You probably do not have 90 million subscribers. But you likely have existing customers. And at some point, you will try to sell them something new: a second service, a product extension, a new category you have decided to move into.
Here is what the MTN story says about that moment: converting an existing customer into a customer for something new is not easier than winning someone who has never heard of you. It feels easier. It looks easier. But your existing customer already has a reason they chose you, and they have most likely already chosen someone else for the thing you are now offering. That prior choice is what you are actually selling against. Not their unfamiliarity with you.
MTN had 90 million people paying them every month. They still could not convert them at scale. Not because the product was completely broken, but because those 90 million people already had a fintech relationship with someone else. Trust in one category does not transfer automatically into trust in another. The Awareness-Experience-Memory journey describes this: awareness alone, even massive awareness built over years, does not skip you to trust. Every new category you enter starts the journey from scratch.
The test worth applying to your own business: can you name, as specifically as Toriola did, what has not worked yet in the adjacent thing you are trying to build? Vague optimism about a new product launch is common. A precise account of why the last attempt did not convert, followed by a specific change made to fix it, is rare. That specificity is usually a better signal of what happens next than the ambition itself.


